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While it is usually known that the mean value of a single observable is enough to detect entan-
glement or its distillability, the counterpart of such an approach in the case of quatum privacy has
been missing. Here we develop the concept of a privacy witness, i.e. a single observable that may
detect presence of the secure key even in the case of bound entanglement. Then we develop the
notion of secret key estimation based on few observables and discuss the witness decomposition into
local measurements. The surprising property of the witness is that with the help of a low number
of product mesurements involved it may still report the key values that are strictly above distillable
entanglement of the state. For an exemplary four-qubit state studied in a recent experiment [K.
Dobek et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 030501 (2011)] this means 6 Pauli operator product mea-
surements versus 81 needed to carry out the complete quantum state tomography. The present
approach may be viewed as a paradigm for the general program of experimentally friendly detection
and estimation of task-dedicated quantum entanglement.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx, 42.50.Dv
I. INTRODUCTION
Entanglement based cryptography [1], equivalent for-
mally to the BB84 scheme [2], is the one that uses the
power of quantum entanglement monogamy obeyed by a
maximally entangled pure quantum state. If the state is
noisy then in some cases it is possible to run an entangle-
ment distillation process [3] which may be interpreted as
quantum privacy amplification [4]. Since the final output
is maximally entangled, it may be used directly for secret
key generation. The efficiency of this procedure is quanti-
fied with distillable entanglement ED, which defines how
many singlet states can be obtained in the asymptotic
regime per one input.
Still it was known that certain states which cannot be
prepared by local operations and classical communication
(LOCC) are not distillable, exhibiting the phenomenon
of bound entanglement [5]. For a long time bound en-
tanglement was believed to be useless for cryptography,
but several years ago it was shown [6, 7], that at least
some bound entangled states may be useful in quantum
cryptography. This is one extreme instance of the gen-
eral fact that the amount of distillable secure key KD
may exceed the amount of distillable singlets ED. The
latter effect has been verified in a recent experiment [8].
The key ingredient in the complete theory of distilling
a secret key from quantum states [6, 7] is the notion of
a private bit, p-bit — or more generally a private dit, p-
dit — which is a delocalized maximally entangled state
that still retains some entanglement monogamy result. A
quantum p-dit is composed from a d⊗d key part AB, and
the shield part A′B′, shared between Alice (subsystems
AA′) and Bob (subsystems BB′) in such a way that the
local von Neumann measurements on the key part in a
particular basis will make its results completely statisti-
cally uncorrelated from the results of any measurement
of an eavesdropper Eve on her subsystem E, which is
a part of the purification |Ψ〉ABA′B′E of the p-dit state
̺ABA′B′ . There is a nice explanation how the shield part
protects the statistics of the measurement on A and B to
be correlated to Eve: it just makes it impossible to dis-
tinguish the results of the measurement by an external
observer.
An obvious way to determine privacy properties is
to reconstruct tomographically the complete p-dit state
̺ABA′B′ . This however is a very time consuming pro-
cess, especially if the system under investigation is high-
dimensional. The aim of the present paper is to give
bounds on the distillable secure key based just on few
observables. This advances further the study presented
in Ref. [9], where it was proposed to carry out a tomog-
raphy of the so-called privacy-squeezed state of the state
of merit. We demonstrate that a single observable suf-
fices to provide a nontrivial bound. We also provide more
accurate estimates based on two observables. These re-
sults provide tools for application-specific detection of
entanglement, refining the fundamental concept of the
entanglement witness proposed in [10] and [11] that can
be also subjected to optimization with respect to local
measurements [12, 13] and used to quantify the amount
of entanglement [14, 15].
The present results can be viewed as an outcome of a
more general research program: experimentally friendly
detection/estimation of task-dedicated quantum entangle-
2ment and/or correlations. In fact it is quite usual that
we are interested in that aspect of entanglement which is
useful for specific quantum information task. The quan-
tity characterizing this aspect may be a monotone but
we believe that it need not to be in general. For in-
stance it is known that there are cases when specific Bell
inequalities which are important for device independent
cryptography are better violated by nonmaximally entan-
gled states. In this context we believe that the present
paradigm will lead to systematic development of exper-
imentally friendly detection/estimation of resources for
quantum information tasks.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we elab-
orate on lower bounds on distillable entanglement and
distillable key. In Sec. III we present a lower bound on
distillable key in terms of single parameter, i.e. single pri-
vacy witness. An approximate version of this bound is
presented in Appendix. In Sec. IV we discuss how to in-
fer privacy of a noisy state from the expectation values
of two observables. Finally, Sec. V concludes the paper.
II. KEY BOUNDS
Let us start by reviewing how an individual observable
can be used to estimate distillable entanglement ED. The
most natural observable in this context is a projector
Wˆent = |Ψmax〉 〈Ψmax| (1)
onto a maximally entangled state |Ψmax〉 =
1√
d
∑d
i=1 |φi〉A ⊗ |ψi〉B of two d-level systems, where
{|φi〉A} and {|ψi〉B} are any two orthonormal bases.
Following the idea of Ref. [3] dealing with the case
d = 2, there is a protocol for an arbitrary d such that
if F (ˆ̺AB) = Tr(Wˆent ˆ̺AB) = 〈Ψmax| ˆ̺AB|Ψmax〉 satisfies
F (ˆ̺AB) >
1
d then the state ˆ̺AB is distillable [16].
The corresponding rate of the distillation protocol can
be easily estimated from below by the hashing protocol
[17, 18] which gives an estimate for the distillable entan-
glement as
ED(ˆ̺AB) ≥ S(ˆ̺B)− S(ˆ̺AB) (2)
where S(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy.
Since an application of the so-called U ⊗ U∗ twirling
[16] can only decrease distillable entanglement ED we
may twirl the state ˆ̺AB in order to bring it to a highly
symmetric form and then apply the hashing inequality
(2) which eventually gives:
ED(ˆ̺AB) ≥ log2 d−H
(
F,
1− F
d2 − 1
, ...,
1− F
d2 − 1
)
, (3)
where F = F (ˆ̺AB) and H({pi}) = −
∑
i pi log2 pi is the
Shannon entropy.
The above formula is valid for any bipartite quantum
state ˆ̺AB. There are more sophisticated twirling proto-
cols. For instance for two qubits there is a protocol [19]
utilizing selected random Pauli operations that brings the
state to a form diagonal in the Bell basis:
ˆ̺BellAB =
4∑
i=1
pi|Ψi〉 〈Ψi| (4)
where |Ψi〉 are Bell states. Applying the hashing protocol
to ˆ̺BellAB leads to:
ED(ˆ̺AB) ≥ 1−H(p1, p2, p3, p4). (5)
Eqs. (3) and (5) provide bounds on the key rate for ˆ̺AB,
as distilled singlet states can be used for the standard
Ekert protocol. In general however, this may be not the
most efficient way to generate the key.
As pointed out in the introduction, a straighforward
way to verify that we have a p-bit or a state close to
p-dit enough that the secret key may be distilled. It is
based on the so-called quantum state tomography which
allows to calculate specific entropic functions that can
be used to estimate the amount of the secret key from
below. A useful quantity is the Devetak-Winter function
K→DW which quantifies the secret key distillable through
a specific one-way secret key distillation protocol:
KD(ˆ̺ABA′B′) ≥ K
→
DW (ˆ̺ABA′B′). (6)
The Devetak-Winter function is given explicitly by the
difference of two Holevo quantities χAB and χAE which
characterize the amount of information that can be re-
covered respectively by Bob and Eve from subsystems B
and E after Alice carried out a von Neumann measure-
ment of the subsystem A in the secure basis {|i〉A}:
K→DW (ˆ̺ABA′B′) = χAB (TrE ˆ̺
cqq
ABE)− χAE (TrB ˆ̺
cqq
ABE) .
(7)
The state ˆ̺cqqABE is given by:
ˆ̺cqqABE = TrA′B′
(∑
i
(
|i〉A〈i| ⊗ 1ˆA′BB′E
)
×|Ψ〉AA′BB′E 〈Ψ|
(
|i〉A〈i| ⊗ 1ˆA′BB′E
))
. (8)
Let us now restrict our attention to a situation when
the key part is composed of two qubits A and B. The
complete density matrix ˆ̺ABA′B′ can be written as a 4×4
array of blocks Aˆij,kl = AB〈ij| ˆ̺ABA′B′ |kl〉AB:
ˆ̺ABA′B′ =


Aˆ00,00 Aˆ00,01 Aˆ00,10 Aˆ00,11
Aˆ01,00 Aˆ01,01 Aˆ01,10 Aˆ01,11
Aˆ10,00 Aˆ10,01 Aˆ10,10 Aˆ10,11
Aˆ11,00 Aˆ11,01 Aˆ11,10 Aˆ11,11

 (9)
It can be transformed by LOCC (with respect to the
partition AA′ : BB′) to the form:
3ˆ̺˜ =


1
2 (Aˆ00,00 + Aˆ11,11) 0 0
1
2 (Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ11,00)
0 12 (Aˆ01,01 + Aˆ10,10)
1
2 (Aˆ01,10 + Aˆ10,01) 0
0 12 (Aˆ01,10 + Aˆ10,01)
1
2 (Aˆ01,01 + Aˆ10,10) 0
1
2 (Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ11,00) 0 0
1
2 (Aˆ00,00 + Aˆ11,11)

 (10)
Which can be ,,unwisted” to Bell diagonal matrix which is directly related to privacy squeezed state (see [7, 9]):
σˆAB =


1
2 ||Aˆ00,00 + Aˆ11,11|| 0 0
1
2 ||Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ11,00||
0 12 ||Aˆ01,01 + Aˆ10,10||
1
2 ||Aˆ01,10 + Aˆ10,01|| 0
0 12 ||Aˆ01,10 + Aˆ10,01||
1
2 ||Aˆ01,01 + Aˆ10,10|| 0
1
2 ||Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ11,00|| 0 0
1
2 ||Aˆ00,00 + Aˆ11,11||

 (11)
where the norm || · || stands for the trace norm.
It will be convenient to write σˆAB in the form:
σˆAB =


1
2 (p1 + p2) 0 0
1
2 (p1 − p2)
0 12 (p3 + p4)
1
2 (p3 − p4) 0
0 12 (p3 − p4)
1
2 (p3 + p4) 0
1
2 (p1 − p2) 0 0
1
2 (p1 + p2)


(12)
It is easy to see that σˆAB is diagonal in the Bell basis
and the parameters pi are occupation probabilities of the
corresponding Bell states.
There is a useful bound on the secret key which is [9]
KD(ˆ̺ABA′B′) ≥ Icl(A : B)− S(σˆAB)
= 1− h(p1 + p2)−H(p1, p2, p3, p4) (13)
Here Icl(A : B) is the classical mutual informa-
tion for the outcomes of von Neumann measurements
carried out by Alice and Bob in the secure basis
|00〉AB, |01〉AB, |10〉AB, |11〉AB. As the joint probability
distribution for these outcomes is { 12 (p1 + p2),
1
2 (p3 +
p4),
1
2 (p3 + p4),
1
2 (p1 + p2)}, we have Icl(A : B) = 1 −
h(p1 + p2), where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x)
denotes the binary entropy.
Note that the bound given in Eq. (13) is weaker than
that on distillable entanglement in Eq. (5). This is be-
cause the state σˆAB does not actually describe the phys-
ical system at any stage of the protocol, but is rather a
formal construct characterizing privacy properties of the
state ˆ̺ABA′B′ of the complete system ABA
′B′.
III. SINGLE PRIVACY WITNESS
The class of secrecy witnesses we shall consider here is
defined formally as
Wˆkey =
(
|11〉AB 〈00|+ |00〉AB 〈11|
)
⊗ UˆA′B′
= (σˆxA ⊗ σˆ
x
B − σˆ
y
A ⊗ σˆ
y
B)⊗ UˆA′B′ (14)
where UˆA′B′ is any hermitian matrix satisfying Uˆ
†Uˆ ≤ 1ˆ
acting on the shield subsystems A′ and B′.
We will use the expectation value of the secrecy witness
〈Wˆkey〉 to approximate the value of p1 − p2. In fact we
have:
w := |〈Wˆkey〉| = Tr[(Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ11,00)Uˆ ]
≤ ||Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ11,00|| = p1 − p2 (15)
since for any matrix satisfying Uˆ †Uˆ ≤ 1ˆ one has
Tr(AˆUˆ) ≤ ||Aˆ||. Indeed, Uˆ †Uˆ ≤ 1ˆ implies ||Uˆ ||∞ ≤ 1 and
consequently TrAˆUˆ ≤ ||AˆUˆ || ≤ ||Aˆ|| · ||Uˆ ||∞. Sometimes
the parameter w may give exactly the value of p1 − p2.
We will give an instance of that at the end of this sec-
tion. Let us also stress that the witness itself (14) is an
observable which must be measured on the original state
(9).
Quantitative estimation of the distillable key will be
based on the following inequality
H(p1, p2, p3, p4) ≤ H
(
p1, p2,
1
2 (1− p1 − p2),
1
2 (1− p1 − p2)
)
(16)
applied to Eq. (13), which yields:
KD ≥ 1− h(p1 + p2)
−H
(
p1, p2,
1
2 (1− p1 − p2),
1
2 (1 − p1 − p2)
)
. (17)
As we are interested in the most pessimistic scenario, we
need to minimize the right hand side over pairs (p1, p2)
that satisfy all the constraints. This gives the central
formula:
KD ≥ 1− sup
p1−p2≥w
p1,p2≥0,p1+p2≤1
[
h(p1 + p2)
+H
(
p1, p2,
1
2 (1− p1 − p2),
1
2 (1− p1 − p2)
)]
(18)
We found numerically the boundary value w∗ at which
the above bound becomes strictly positive, i.e. the wit-
ness condition w = |〈Wˆkey〉| > w
∗, to be equal to
w∗ ≈ 0.907.
We can simplify the optimization in Eq. (18) by in-
troducing a new pair of variables p+ = p1 + p2 and
ξ+ = p1/(p1 + p2). A straightforward calculation shows
4that the bound for the key expressed in the new variables
takes the form:
KD ≥ inf
w≤p+≤1
(w+p+)/2p+≤ξ+≤1
(
p+ − 2h(p+)− p+h(ξ+)
)
. (19)
Because the lower limit for ξ+ is greater or equal to
1/2, optimization over ξ+ for a fixed value of p+ yields
h(ξ+) ≤ h
(
(w + p+)/2p+
)
. Consequently, the minimiza-
tion in Eq. (19) needs to be carried out over a single
parameter p+:
KD ≥ inf
w≤p+≤1
[
p+−2h(p+)−p+h
(
(w+p+)/2p+
)]
. (20)
The absolute minimum of this expression is analyzed in
Appendix. However we can simplify the bound in two
ways leading to weaker but more compact formulas:
Weaker bound 1: Suppose that w ≥ (1 − w)/3 which
is equivalent to w ≥ 1/4. Then we have the following
estimate:
KD ≥ 1− h(w) −H
(
w, 13 (1− w),
1
3 (1− w),
1
3 (1 − w)
)
(21)
In the last inequality we have used the fact that both
p1 + p2 ≥ w and p1 ≥ w.
Weaker bound 2: There is a possibility of having an-
other bound with help of subadditivity of the entropy
H [p1, p2, p3, p4] ≤ h(p1 + p2) + h(p1 + p3).
KD ≥ 1− 2h(w)− h
(
1
2 (1 + w)
)
(22)
For a graphic comparison of the derived formulas see
Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1: Graphs of lower bounds on the distillable key as a
function of w = |〈Wˆpriv〉| derived in Eqs. (18) (solid line),
(21) (dashed line), and (22) (dotted line).
The above considerations are based on the ccq sce-
nario, when Alice and Bob measure their qubits in
the secure key basis |0〉, |1〉. However if the shield
part is not affected by local unitary the optimal Uˆ re-
mains unchanged. For instance, in the case of the
four-qubit state whose approximate version was realized
experimentally in Ref. [8], a two-qubit swap operator
VˆA′B′ = 1ˆA′B′ − 2|Ψ−〉A′B′ 〈Ψ−| used in the privacy wit-
ness would give exactly the value |〈Wˆpriv〉| = p1 − p2.
Note also that if Uˆ were not hermitian, we could de-
compose Uˆ = UˆR + iUˆI and measure two observables
WˆRkey = (|11〉AB〈00| + |00〉AB〈11|) ⊗ UˆR and Wˆ
I
key =
(|11〉AB〈00|+ |00〉AB〈11|)⊗ UˆI .
IV. TWO-OBSERVABLE PRIVACY
ESTIMATION
In this section we will show how to characterize the
privacy properties of a noisy entangled state from expec-
tation values of two observables. The first one, given by
σˆzA⊗ σˆ
z
B⊗ 1ˆA′B′ , characterizes correlations between mea-
surements performed on the subsystems A and B in the
key basis. The security of the key will be inferred using
the expectation value of an observable σˆxA ⊗ σˆ
x
B ⊗ UˆA′B′ .
In the further discussion it will be convenient to use
the following parameterization of σˆAB :
σˆAB =


1
2p+ 0 0 p+(ξ+ −
1
2 )
0 12p− p−(ξ− −
1
2 ) 0
0 p−(ξ− − 12 )
1
2p− 0
p+(ξ+ −
1
2 ) 0 0
1
2p+

 .
(23)
The nonnegative parameters p+ = p1 + p2 and p− =
1−p+ = p3+p4 can be interpreted as occupation proba-
bilities of the correlated and the anticorrelated subspaces,
spanned respectively by pairs or vectors |00〉AB, |11〉AB
and |01〉AB, |10〉AB. The other two parameters, given
explicitly by ξ+ = p1/p+ and ξ− = p3/p−, character-
ize the off-diagonal elements of σˆAB respectively in the
correlated and the anticorrelated sectors and therefore
contain information about the privacy properties. Be-
cause the off-diagonal elements of σˆAB are nonnegative
due to the definition given in Eq. (11) and must ensure
positive definiteness of σˆAB , the parameters ξ−, ξ+ sat-
isfy the inequality:
1
2
≤ ξ+, ξ− ≤ 1, (24)
i.e. the relevant region for pairs (ξ−, ξ+) has the shape of
a square.
In the new parameterization, the lower bound on the
key takes the following form:
KD ≥ 1− 2h(p+)− p+h(ξ+)− p−h(ξ−). (25)
Because the binary entropies h(ξ+) and h(ξ−) are non-
negative, a necessary condition for this bound to be non-
trivial is h(p+) <
1
2 , otherwise the right hand side is
not positive. This means that p+ must satisfy either
0 ≤ p+ < 1 − p
∗ or p∗ < p+ ≤ 1, where p∗ ≈ 0.89 is
the bigger of two solutions of a transcedental equation
h(p∗) = 12 on the interval 0 ≤ p
∗ ≤ 1. We will restrict
our further discussion only to the case p∗ < p+ ≤ 1,
as the analysis of the second case 0 ≤ p+ < 1 − p
∗ is
completely analogous.
Let us now discuss how the parameters of σˆAB are
related to measured observables. The parameters p± can
be evaluated directly from the measured observables as
p± = 12
(
1± 〈σˆzA ⊗ σˆ
z
B ⊗ 1ˆA′B′〉
)
. Following discussion
after Eq. (25), we will be interested in the regime when
p+ > p
∗. Considering the other regime when p+ < 1 −
p∗ effectively boils down to swapping the roles of the
5correlated and the anticorrelated subspaces. These two
possibilities can be analyzed jointly by defining
wz :=
∣∣〈σˆzA ⊗ σˆzB ⊗ 1ˆA′B′〉∣∣ (26)
and using in further discussion
p± =
1
2
(1± wz). (27)
The condition p+ > p
∗ can be equivalently written as
wz > 2p
∗ − 1 ≈ 0.78 (28)
which defines the minimum value of wz above which the
bound on the key can become nontrivial.
The second quantity we will use in our analysis will be
wx :=
∣∣〈σˆxA ⊗ σˆxB ⊗ UˆA′B′〉∣∣. (29)
It allows us to bound the parameters ξ− and ξ+ according
to the following inequality which will be at the heart of
our reasoning:
wx =
∣∣Tr[Uˆ(Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ01,10 + Aˆ10,01 + Aˆ11,00)]∣∣
≤ ||Aˆ00,11 + Aˆ11,00||+ ||Aˆ01,10 + Aˆ10,01||
= p+(2ξ+ − 1) + p−(2ξ− − 1). (30)
For fixed p±, this inequality determines the allowed re-
gion of (ξ−, ξ+) in the square defined by Eq. (24) as
p−ξ− + p+ξ+ ≥ 12 (1 + wx). (31)
When evaluating the lower bound on the key rate KD
according to Eq. (25) we are interested in the worst case
scenario that is consistent with the measurement results.
Therefore our task is to minimize the right hand side of
Eq. (25) under constraints given by Eqs. (24) and (31).
This is equivalent to maximizing under the same con-
straints a concave function
f(ξ−, ξ+) = p−h(ξ−) + p+h(ξ+). (32)
The lower bound on the key can be written as
KD ≥ 1− 2h(p+)− f
max, (33)
where fmax is the maximum of f(ξ−, ξ+) over the al-
lowed region of parameters. It is useful to note that be-
cause f(ξ−, ξ+) is a convex linear combination of binary
entropies h(ξ−) and h(ξ+), within the square given by
Eq. (24) decreasing either of the arguments ξ− or ξ+ will
always increase the value of f(ξ−, ξ+). This in turn im-
plies that fmax is reached on the line
p−ξ− + p+ξ+ = 12 (1 + wx). (34)
To proceed with the maximization, let us start from
an observation that if ξ+ =
1
2 , i.e. the correlated sector
of the density matrix has zero off-diagonal elements, no
positive key rate can be guaranteed by Eq. (25). This
follows from a straightforward fact that the expression
1−2h(p+)−p+ is nonpositive for p
∗ < p+ ≤ 1. Therefore
no point with ξ+ =
1
2 should satisfy Eq. (31). Because
the slope of the line (34) is negative, it is sufficient to
require that the point (ξ− = 1, ξ+ = 12 ) is outside the
allowed region. This is equivalent to the inequality:
wx + wz > 1. (35)
Further analysis depends on whether the point (ξ− =
1
2 , ξ+ = 1) is located within the allowed region of param-
eters. It is easy to verify that this is determined by the
relation between p+ and wx. If p+ > wx, this point sat-
isfies Eq. (31) and the allowed region of parameters has
the shape of a trapezoid, as shown in Fig. 2(a). Conse-
quently, all values 12 ≤ ξ− ≤ 1 are allowed. On the other
hand, when p+ ≤ wx, the allowed region is a triangle, as
depicted in Fig. 2(b). The minimum allowed value of ξ−
is then (wx − wz)/(1 − wz). We can combine these two
cases by defining
ξmin− = max
{
1
2
,
wx − wz
1− wz
}
(36)
The maximization of f(ξ−, ξ+) over the line defined in
Eq. (34) can now be written as a supremum over a single
parameter:
fmax = sup
ξmin
−
≤ξ≤1
f
(
ξ,
1 + wx
1 + wz
− ξ
1− wz
1 + wz
)
(37)
which inserted into Eq. (33) yields the final form of the
bound:
KD ≥ 1− 2h(p+)
− sup
ξmin
−
≤ξ≤1
[
(1− p+)h(ξ) + p+h
(
1 + wx
1 + wz
− ξ
1− wz
1 + wz
)]
(38)
where p+ = (1 + wz)/2. The results of a numerical eval-
uation of the supremum are shown in Fig. 3(a).
It is also possible to derive a slightly weaker bound
that requires no numerical maximization, which we will
denote as f˜max. Because the function f(ξ−, ξ+) is mono-
tonic in each one of its two arguments, as discussed after
Eq. (33), we have
fmax ≤ f˜max = f(ξmin− , ξ
min
+ ). (39)
where ξmin− and ξ
min
+ are the smallest possible values of
ξ− and ξ+ within the allowed region defined by Eqs. (24)
and (31). The value ξmin− has been given explicitly in
Eq. (36), while it is easy to verify that
ξmin+ =
wx + wz
1 + wz
. (40)
The simplified bound therefore takes the following ex-
plicit form:
KD ≥ 1− 2h(p+)− (1− p+)h
(
ξmin−
)
− p+h
(
wx + wz
1 + wz
)
(41)
6FIG. 2: The permitted region of the parameters (ξ
−
, ξ+) used
to maximize the function f(ξ
−
, ξ+) defined in Eq. (32).
FIG. 3: The lower bound on the key as a function of wx and
wz obtained from (a) full optimization over the free parame-
ters specified in Eq. (38) and (b) a weaker estimate according
to Eq. (41). The bound is positive in the shaded area, with
solid contours drawn at steps 0.1 starting from 0.
FIG. 4: The lower bound on the key given in Eq. (43) obtained
from observables w and wz. The physical region is restricted
to points (w,wz) satisfying the condition (1 + wz)/2 ≥ w.
The coding of the bound value is the same as in Fig. 3.
which is shown in Fig. 3(b).
Finally, let us note that the observable w defined in
Eq. (15) can be combined with wz to yield a stronger
bound on the distillable key. To derive this bound, let us
return to Eq. (25) and estimate the last two terms on the
right hand side. The inequality shown in Eq. (15) rewrit-
ten in the new parametization provides a lower bound on
ξ+:
ξ+ ≥
1
2
+
w
2p+
. (42)
Because the right hand side is greater or equal 1/2, we
have h(ξ+) ≤ h(1/2 + w/2p+). Further, we obviously
have h(ξ−) ≤ 1. This yields:
KD ≥ p+ [1− h (1/2 + w/2p+)]− 2h (p+) . (43)
Let us note that physical values of w and wz must satisfy
the condition (1 + wz)/2 ≥ w, otherwise we would have
p1+p2 = p+ = (1+wz)/2 < w ≤ p1−p2 and consequently
p2 < 0. In Fig. 4 we depict the bound (43) in the physical
region of w and wz .
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a privacy witness, i.e.
an observable, whose mean value allows one to estimate
nontrivially from below the amount of secret key, even in
the case when the resulting state exhibits the separation
of the secret key and the distillable entanglement. In fact
this separation may be quite drastic while the witness is
working perfectly. To see this let us take A′B′ being
7d⊗ d-level systems and consider a p-bit state ̺ABA′B′ in
the form [6]
ˆ̺ABA′B′ =
1
2d2
[
(|00〉AB 〈00|+ |11〉AB 〈11|)⊗ 1ˆA′B′
+ (|00〉AB 〈11|+ |11〉AB 〈00|)⊗ VˆA′B′
]
(44)
where 1ˆA′B′ and VˆA′B′ stand respectively for bipartite
identity and swap operator on the subsystems A′B′.
In the limit of large d the distillable entanglement is
bounded by vanishing log-negativity ED ≤ log2(1+
1
d )→
0, while the privacy witness W = (σˆxA⊗ σˆ
x
B + σˆ
y
A⊗ σˆ
y
B)⊗
VˆA′B′ gives us the value of lower bound KD ≥ 1 since
w = Tr(Wˆ ˆ̺ABA′B′) = 1 and then just either of the
weaker bounds given in Eqs. (21) or (22) does the job.
Note in particular that since the key part AB is a two
qubit part the above estimate gives the maximum pos-
sible value of the secret key KD = log2 2 = 1 despite
the fact that the distillable entanglement of the state is
almost zero!
In general the complexity of measuring the privacy wit-
ness is related to the Hilbert-Schmidt decomposition of
the hermitian operator Uˆ used to construct the witness
[12]. In the case of the four qubit state that was stud-
ied in the experiment reported in Ref. [8] the operator in
question is the swap operator which is composed of three
terms involving products of Pauli matrices:
VˆA′B′ =
1
2
(1ˆA′B′+σˆ
x
A′⊗σˆ
x
B′+σˆ
y
A′⊗σˆ
y
B′+σˆ
z
A′⊗σˆ
z
B′). (45)
Taking into account the necessary measurements on the
key part this gives in total 2 × 3 = 6 observables to be
measured, each formed by a product of four Pauli matri-
ces. This is dramatically less then the full tomography
which requires 81 products of four Pauli matrices. Note
that in some cases, like the p-bit state discussed above,
such an apparently poor measurement has no problem
in reporting the key value that lies above the distillable
entanglement, which is bounded for our example by the
log negativity value ED(̺) ≤ log2(1 +
1
2 ) ≈ 0.585.
The above approach may be extended to higher dimen-
sions and other twirling techniques may be applied. It
may be especially useful when the experimentalist has a
good guess about the expected p-bit he state in the labo-
ratory then he or she may estimate the high key contents
almost perfectly even if there is virtually no distillable
entanglement in the system. Finally let us note that
the very difficult problem is to find the nonlinear entan-
glement witness that would capture collective behavior
revealing the key in all the cases when any single-copy
entropic fuction based on a one-way protocol fails. It
seems that for this one needs quantum secrecy distilla-
tion protocols of new generation.
We believe that the present approach will lead to
general and systematic development of experimentally
friendly methods for detection and estimation of task-
dedicated quantum entanglement and other resources.
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Appendix A: Single witness bound
Let us denote
κ(p+) = p+ − 2h(p+)− p+h
(
(p+ + w)/2p+
)
. (A1)
The derivative with respect to p+ reads:
dκ
dp+
=
1
2
log2
p2+(p
2
+ − w
2)
(1− p+)4
. (A2)
It is easy to see that on the interval w ≤ p+ ≤ 1 the
argument of the logarithm function runs from 0 to +∞.
Therefore κ(p+) reaches its minimum at a root of a poly-
nomial equation p2+(p
2
+ − w
2) = (1 − p+)
4. This is a
cubic equation which can be solved exactly, but a simpli-
fied formula can be found by substituting p+ = w+δ and
assuming that δ ≪ 1−w which is motivated by numerical
analysis. This yields δ ≈ (1−w)4/2w3 and consequently
the bound on the key in the approximate form
KD ≥ κ
(
w +
(1 − w)4
2w3
)
. (A3)
This approximate expression turns out to reproduce the
original bound quite tightly, as evidenced in Fig. 5 de-
picting the difference between Eq. (A3) and the bound
given in Eq. (19).
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FIG. 5: The difference between the bounds from Eqs. (19)
and (A3) as a function of the parameter w.
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